The other day, one of the readers over at the other blog
asked a question as sensible as it is timely: why do so many sane people start
foaming at the mouth when the subject of this year’s US presidential election
comes up? It’s a fair question.
Even by the embarrassing standards of political discourse that apply to
the United States these days, the blend of sheer paralogic, parroted sound
bites, and white-hot rage that can be heard from the supporters of both major
party candidates is out of the ordinary. I spent some time mulling over the
question, and I think I know the answer: cognitive dissonance.
That wasn’t necessary, nor is any future climate change activism required to make the same mistakes all over again. In an upcoming post, I plan on sketching out how a future movement to stop treating the atmosphere as an aerial sewer and start mitigating the ecological impact of our idiocy to date might proceed. The specific suggestions I’ll offer will be tentative, but the lessons taught by the success of the campaign for same-sex marriage rights will be incorporated in them—and so will the equally important lessons taught over and over again by the failure of other movements for social change in our time.
That can be explained by a simple thought experiment. Let’s imagine, dear reader, that you
were to go into a Starbuck’s in a hip neighborhood in Portland, Oregon, and ask
the people there—dyed-in-the-wool Democrats to a man, woman, gender-nonspecific
individual, and child—to describe their nightmare presidential candidate, the
person they’d least like to see in the White House next January.
They’d tell you that it would be a political insider openly
in bed with banks and big business who spent years in public service pandering
to the rich, who is also a neoconservative who pursued regime-change operations
against Third World countries and was committed to military confrontation with
the Russians. The candidate would have a track record supporting the kind of
trade agreements that allow corporations to overturn environmental laws, and
would also be dogged by embarrassingly detailed allegations of corruption on a
stunningly blatant scale. The candidate would insist that everything was just
fine with America, and anyone who disagreed was just being negative. Oh, and it
would help if the candidate had engaged in race-baiting behavior, and had
insisted that a woman’s claim that she was raped wasn’t to be taken seriously
if it was directed at a member of the candidate’s own family.
That is to say, the rank and file Democrats’ idea of the
worst possible President is Hillary Clinton.
Now let’s imagine that you were to hop on a Greyhound, get
off in Bowling Green, Kentucky, head for the nearest Southern Baptist church
social, and ask the people there—dyed-in-the-wool Republicans down to the very
last lady, gentleman, and well-scrubbed child—to describe their nightmare
presidential candidate, the person they’d least like to see in the White House
come January.
They’d tell you that of course it would be a Yankee from New
York City, which still edges out Los Angeles in the minds of many of the godly
as the ultimate cesspit of evil in North America. The candidate would be a
profiteer who made a pile of money exploiting vice, a wheeler-dealer who
repeatedly declared bankruptcy to get out from under inconvenient debts. The candidate
would be vulgar—you have no idea of the force of this word until you’ve heard
it uttered in tones of total disdain by an elderly woman who’s a downwardly
mobile descendant of Southern planters—and a hypocrite in religious matters,
mouthing only such Christian catchphrases as might help win the election. Such
a candidate would of course be on a second or third or fourth marriage, have
fathered a child out of wedlock, and would fail to show any trace of pious
horror toward gays, lesbians, transexuals, and the like. Finally, such a
candidate would claim that America is no longer the greatest nation on Earth
and has to make sweeping changes to become great again.
That is to say, the rank and file Republicans’ idea of the
worst possible President is Donald Trump.
I suppose its probably too late in the game for both of the
parties to do the right thing and swap candidates, so that the Republicans can
go back to running a corrupt establishment neoconservative and the Democrats
can field a libertine populist demagogue. Lacking such a sensible move, it’s
not at all surprising that so many people have basically gone gaga, as
Democratic and Republican voters try to convince themselves that they really do
want to vote for someone who’s literally everything they least want in the Oval
Office. That degree of cognitive dissonance does not make for calm discussions,
rational decisions, or sane politics.
We can therefore expect any number of bizarre outbursts as
the current race settles which of the two most detested persons in American
public life gets the dubious benefit of putting a hand on the Bible next
January, and becoming the notional leader of a bitterly divided nation in the
throes of accelerating political, economic, and social decline. While that
plays out, though, there are other dimensions of politics that deserve
discussion, and some of them surfaced in a big way in response to my post last
month talking about the
failure of climate change activism to achieve any of its goals.
That post attracted quite a few hostile comments and no
shortage of furious denunciations. A very large number of these focused on one
detail in the post: the comparison
I drew between climate change activism and the campaign for the right to
same-sex marriage here in the United States, in that both faced a well-funded
opposition that pursued a scurrilous campaign of disinformation against them.
The campaign for same-sex marriage, I pointed out, triumphed anyway, so the
defeat of climate change activism couldn’t be blamed on the opposition alone;
the reasons why climate change activism had failed, while the right to same-sex
marriage was now the law of the land, had to be taken into account.
This, however, a remarkably large number of my readers were
unwilling to do. They insisted that the goal of the campaign for same-sex
marriage rights was a simple, straightforward change in laws that affected very
few people, while the goal of climate change activism was a comprehensive
overturn of every aspect of contemporary life. Some of them got rhetorical on
the grand scale, painting the sheer overwhelming difficulty of doing anything
about climate change in such daunting colors that I don’t think all the climate
denialists on the planet, backed by a grant from Exxon, could have equalled it.
It seems never to have occurred to them to ask whether there was a way to
reframe their goal into something more like same-sex marriage—something, that
is, that they might be able to accomplish.
More generally, the core of the hostile response was an
absolute rejection of the idea that the climate change movement should learn
anything from its failure. That’s a surrender more total than anything Exxon’s
board of directors could have hoped for in their fondest dreams. Movements for
social change that want to win always take each temporary defeat as a learning
experience, draw lessons from the failure, and change their tactics, strategy,
and framing of the issue based on those lessons, then fling themselves back
into the struggle with a better chance at victory. They also look at other
movements that succeed and ask themselves, “How can we do the same thing with
our cause?” Movements for social change that respond to failure by reaching for
excuses and trying to convince themselves and everyone else that the battle
could never have been won in the first place, on the other hand, get a shallow
grave and a water-color epitaph.
For what it’s worth, I think there’s something even more
important to be learned from the insistence that the lessons of the movement
for same-sex marriage rights can’t possibly be applied to climate change
activism. The same-sex marriage movement was notable among recent initiatives
on the leftward end of the political spectrum for two distinctive features. The
first was that it went out of its way to violate the conventional wisdom that’s
governed activism in the US since the early 1980s. The second is that it won.
These two things are by no means unrelated. In fact, I’d like to suggest that certain habits, which have
been de rigueur for social change
movements for the last thirty years, have been responsible for their near-total
failure to accomplish their goals over that period.
Let’s take a look at those habits one at a time.
1. Piggybacking
This is the insistence that any movement for social change
has to make room on its agenda for all the other currently popular movements
for social change, and has to divert some of its time, labor, and resources to
each of these other movements. Start a movement for any one purpose, and you
can count on being swarmed by activists who insist they want to be your
allies. Some insist that they’re
eager to help you so long as you’re willing to help them, some insist that you
can best pursue your goal by helping them pursue theirs, some insist that
theirs is so much more important than yours that if you’re a decent person you
should drop your cause and join them, but it all amounts to a demand that you
divert some of your money, time, labor, and other resources from your cause to
theirs.
Behind the facade of solidarity, that is, the social-change
scene is a Darwinian environment in which movements compete for access to
people, money, and enthusiasm. Piggybacking is one of the standard competitive
strategies, and it really goes into overdrive as soon as your movement comes up
with a plan to do something concrete about the problem you’re trying to solve.
At this point, your allies can be counted on to insist that your plan isn’t
acceptable unless it also does something to benefit their cause. You can’t just
fix A, in other words; you’ve also got to do something about B, C, D, and so on
to Z—and long before you get there, your plan has stopped being workable,
because no possible set of actions can solve all the world’s problems at once.
One of the things that set the campaign for same-sex
marriage rights apart from other movements for social change, in turn, is that
it refused to fall for piggybacking. It kept its focus on its actual
goal—getting same-sex couples the right to marry—and refused to listen to the
many voices that insisted that it was unrealistic to pursue this goal all by
itself, and they should get in line, join the grand movement for social change,
and wait their turn. If they’d listened, they’d still be waiting. Instead, they
succeeded.
2. The Partisan Trap
The Democratic Party is the place where environmental causes
go to die. To some extent, today’s US partisan politics is the ultimate example
of piggybacking; movements on the leftward end of things have been talked into
believing that they should put their energy into getting Democratic candidates
elected, rather than pursuing their own agendas, and as a result Democratic candidates
get elected but the movements for social change find that their own causes go
nowhere.
This isn’t accidental. Both US parties have perfected the
art of reducing once-independent movements for social change into captive
constituencies, which keep on working to elect candidates for one or the other
party, while getting essentially nothing in return. The Democratic party
establisnment has no more interest in seeing climate change activism succeed
than their Republican opposite numbers have in seeing the antiabortion movement
succeed; in both cases, that would cause the movements to fade away, as
movements do when they triumph, and important captive constituencies would be
lost to the parties that own them. It’s much more profitable to the party apparatchiks
to toss occasional crumbs to their captive constituencies, blame the other
party for the failure of the captive constituencies to achieve any of their
goals, and insist every four years that their captive constituencies have to
vote the way they’re told, because the other party is so much worse.
The campaign for same-sex marriage rights managed to break
out of that trap despite the strenuous efforts of both parties to keep it in
its assigned place. It so happens that there are a significant number of gay
and lesbian people who are Republicans—who vote for GOP candidates, donate to
GOP campaigns, and take part in party activities—and they bombarded their
Republican legislators with letters demanding that the GOP do what it claims it
wants to do, and get government off people’s backs. This played a significant
role in bringing about the collapse of GOP opposition to same-sex marriage, and
thus to the success of the movement.
3. Purity Politics
The creation of a movement that included Republican as well
as Democratic gays, lesbians, and sympathetic straight people also violated
another commandment of contemporary left-wing activism, which is that movements
for social change must exclude everyone who fails any of a battery of tests of
ideological purity. It’s been pointed out, and truly, that the Right looks for
allies to attract while the Left looks for heretics to expel; this is one of
the reasons that for the last forty years, the Right has been so much more
successful than the Left.
To some extent, purity politics is simply the flipside of
piggybacking. If your movement also has to support every other movement on the
leftward end of things, the only people who will be attracted to your movement
are those few who also agree with the agendas of every one of the other
movements on the list. Still, there’s more going on here than that. I’ve
written in a previous post here about the way that narratives
about race in America have been transformed into a dysfunctional game
in which bullying an assortment of real and imagined persecutors has taken the
place of doing anything to better the lives of those affected by racial
injustice. Purity politics rises out of the same dynamic, and it’s played a
large role in taking any number of potentially successful movements and
reducing them to five or six people in an empty room, each of them glaring
suspiciously at all the others, constantly on the lookout for any sign of deviant
thinking.
One of the reasons the movement for same-sex marriage rights
triumphed, in turn, was precisely that it refused to get into purity politics.
All that mattered, in large parts of the movement, was that you were in favor
of giving same-sex couples the right to marry, and a great many people who
weren’t in favor of the whole gamut of social-change movements were in fact
perfectly willing to let gay and lesbian couples tie the knot. That capacity to
bridge ideological divides and find common ground on a single issue isn’t a
guarantee of victory, but refusing to do so is almost always a guarantee of
defeat.
4. Pandering to the Privileged
No one ever built a mass movement by appealing to an
affluent minority. That’s one of the major reasons why so few movements for
social change these days show the least sign of becoming mass movements. Since
the early 1980s, most activists have framed their appeals and their campaigns
as though the only audience that mattered consisted of affluent liberals, and
as often as not went out of their way to ignore or even insult the great
majority of Americans—you know, the people who would have had to be on their
side if their cause was going to achieve any kind of lasting victory.
I’ve discussed in
other posts on this blog the extent to which class issues have become
a taboo subject in contemporary politics, precisely during the decades in which
the once-prosperous American working classes have been destroyed. In our
collective conversation about politics, you can talk about race, you can talk
about gender, you can even talk about the very rich, but if you talk about
another very important divide—the divide between the people who earn salaries
and have done very well for themselves, and the people who earn wages and have
been driven into poverty and misery by easily identifiable policies supported
across the board by the people who earn salaries—you can count on being shouted
down. (One of the many advantages of having this conversation on the fringes
where archdruids lurk is that the shouting is slightly muffled out here.)
A great many soi-disant radicals have thus ended up trotting
meekly along after the privileged classes, begging for scraps from the tables
of the affluent rather than risking so much as a raised eyebrow of disapproval
from them. Real change will come to the United States when others learn, as
Donald Trump already has, that the exclusion of the needs, interests, and
viewpoints of wage-earning Americans from our national politics and public
discourse has shattered their once-robust faith in the status quo and made them
ripe for political mobilization. That change need not be for the better; if the
mainstream parties continue to act as though only the affluent matter, the next
person who finds a following among the wage class may have a taste for armbands
and jackboots, or for that matter, for roadside bombs and guerrilla warfare;
but change will come.
The movement for same-sex marriage rights had a great
advantage here, in that the policy changes it wanted to put in place were just
as advantageous for wage-earning same-sex couples in Bowling Green and Omaha as
for salary-class same-sex couples in Seattle and Boston. (If you don’t think
there are wage-earning same-sex couples in Bowling Green and Omaha, by the way,
you need to get out more.) That
gave their movement a mass following that, even if court rulings hadn’t made
the point moot, had already begun to win votes on a state-by-state basis and
would have won a great many more.
And the movement against anthropogenic climate change? If
you’ve been following along, dear reader, you’ll already have noticed that it
fell victim to all four of the bad habits just enumerated—the four
horsepersons, if you will, of the apocalyptic failure of radicalism in our
time. It allowed itself to be distracted from its core purpose by a flurry of
piggybacking interests; it got turned into a captive constituency of the
Democratic Party; it suffers from a bad case of purity politics, in which (to
raise a point I’ve made before) anyone who questions the capacity of renewable
resources to replace fossil fuels, without conservation taking up much of the
slack, is denounced as a denialist; and it has consistently pandered to the
privileged, pursuing policies that benefit the well-to-do at the expense of the
working poor. Those bad habits
helped foster the specific mistakes I enumerated in my earlier post-mortem on
climate change activism, and led the movement to crushing defeat.
