It's one thing to suggest, as I did in last week’s post
here, that North America a few centuries from now might have something like
five per cent of its current population. It’s quite another thing to talk about
exactly whose descendants will comprise that five per cent. That’s what I
intend to do this week, and yes, I know that raising that issue is normally a
very good way to spark a shouting match in which who-did-what-to-whom rhetoric
plays its usual role in drowning out everything else.
Now of course there’s a point to talking about, and learning
from, the abuses inflicted by groups of people on other groups of people over
the last five centuries or so of North American history. Such discussions, though, have very little to
offer the topic of the current series of posts here on The Archdruid
Report. History may be a
source of moral lessons but it’s not a moral phenomenon; a glance back over our
past shows clearly enough that who won, who lost, who ended up ruling a
society, and who ended up enslaved or exterminated by that same society, was
not determined by moral virtue or by the justice of one or another cause, but
by the crassly pragmatic factors of military, political, and economic power. No
doubt most of us would rather live in a world that didn’t work that way, but
here we are, and morality remains a matter of individual choices—yours and
mine—in the face of a cosmos that seems sublimely unconcerned with our moral
beliefs.
Thus we can take it for granted that just as the borders
that currently divide North America were put there by force or the threat of
force, the dissolution of those borders and their replacement with new lines of
division will happen the same way. For that matter, it’s a safe bet that the
social divisions—ethnic and otherwise—of the successor cultures that emerge in
the aftermath of our downfall will be established and enforced by means no more
just or fair than the ones that currently distribute wealth and privilege to
the different social and ethnic strata in today’s North American nations.
Again, it would be pleasant to live in a world where that isn’t true, but we
don’t.
I apologize to any of my readers who are offended or upset
by these points. In order to make any kind of sense of the way that
civilizations fall—and more to the point, the way that ours is currently
falling—it’s essential to get past the belief that history is under any
obligation to hand out rewards for good behavior and punishments for the
opposite, or for that matter the other way around. Over the years and decades
and centuries ahead of us, as industrial civilization crumbles, a great many
people who believe with all their hearts that their cause is right and just are
going to die anyway, and there will be no shortage of brutal, hateful, vile
individuals who claw their way to the top—for a while, at least. One of the
reliable features of dark ages is that while they last, the top of the heap is
a very unsafe place to be.
North America being what it is today, a great many people
considering the sort of future I’ve just sketched out immediately start
thinking about the potential for ethnic conflict, especially but not only in
the United States. It’s an issue worth discussing, and not only for the currently
obvious reasons. Conflict between ethnic groups is quite often a major issue in
the twilight years of a civilization, for reasons we’ll discuss shortly, but
it’s also self-terminating, for an interesting reason: traditional ethnic
divisions don’t survive dark ages. In an age of political dissolution, economic
implosion, social chaos, demographic collapse, and mass migration, the factors
that maintain established ethnic divisions in place don’t last long. In their
place, new ethnicities emerge. It’s a
commonplace of history that dark ages are the cauldron from which nations are
born.
So we have three stages, which overlap to a greater or
lesser degree: a stage of ethnic conflict, a stage of ethnic dissolution, and a
stage of ethnogenesis. Let’s take them one at a time.
The stage of ethnic conflict is one effect of the economic
contraction that’s inseparable from the decline of a civilization. If a rising tide lifts all boats, as
economists of the trickle-down school used to insist, a falling tide has a much
more differentiated effect, since each group in a declining society does its
best to see to it that as much as possible of the costs of decline land on
someone else. Since each group’s access
to wealth and privilege determines fairly exactly how much influence it has on
the process, it’s one of the constants of decline and fall that the costs and
burdens of decline trickle down, landing with most force on those at the bottom
of the pyramid.
That heats up animosities across the board: between ethnic
groups, between regions, between political and religious divisions, you name
it. Since everyone below the uppermost levels of wealth and power loses some of
what they’ve come to expect, and since it’s human nature to pay more attention
to what you’ve lost than to the difference between what you’ve retained and
what someone worse off than you has to make do with, everyone’s aggrieved, and
everyone sees any attempt by someone else to better their condition as a
threat. That’s by no means entirely inaccurate—if the pie’s shrinking, any
attempt to get a wider slice has to come at somebody else’s expense—but it fans
the flames of conflict even further, helping to drive the situation toward the
inevitable explosions.
One very common and very interesting feature of this process
is that the increase in ethnic tensions tend to parallel a process of ethnic
consolidation. In the United States a century ago, for example, the division of
society by ethnicity wasn’t anything so like as simple as it is today. The
uppermost caste in most of the country wasn’t simply white, it was white male
Episcopalians whose ancestors got here from northwestern Europe before the
Revolutionary War. Irish ranked below Germans but above Italians, who looked
down on Jews, and so on down the ladder to the very bottom, which was occupied
by either African-Americans or Native Americans depending on locality. Within
any given ethnicity, furthermore, steep social divisions existed, microcosms of
a hierarchically ordered macrocosm; gender distinctions and a great many other
lines of fracture combined with the ethnic divisions just noted to make
American society in 1914 as intricately caste-ridden as any culture on the
planet.
The partial dissolution of many of these divisions has
resulted inevitably in the hardening of those that remain. That’s a common
pattern, too: consider the way that the rights of Roman citizenship expanded
step by step from the inhabitants of the city of Rome itself, to larger and
larger fractions of the people it dominated, until finally every free adult
male in the Empire was a Roman citizen by definition. Parallel to that process
came a hardening of the major divisions, between free persons and slaves on the
one hand, and between citizens of the Empire and the barbarians outside its
borders on the other. The result was the same in that case as it is in ours:
traditional, parochial jealousies and prejudices focused on people one step
higher or lower on the ladder of caste give way to new loyalties and hatreds
uniting ever greater fractions of the population into increasingly large and
explosive masses.
The way that this interlocks with the standard mechanisms of
decline and fall will be a central theme of future posts. The crucial detail,
though, is that a society riven by increasingly bitter divisions of the sort
just sketched out is very poorly positioned to deal with external pressure or
serious crisis. “Divide and conquer,” the Romans liked to say during the
centuries of their power: splitting up
their enemies and crushing them one at a time was the fundamental strategy they
used to build their empire. On the way down, though, it was the body of Roman
society that did the dividing, tearing itself apart along every available line
of schism, and Rome was accordingly conquered in its turn. That’s usual for
falling civilizations, and we’re well along the same route in the United States
today.
Ethnic divisions thus routinely play a significant role in
the crash of civilizations. Still, as noted above, the resulting chaos quickly
shreds the institutional arrangements that make ethnic divisions endure in a
settled society. Charismatic leaders emerge out of the chaos, and those that
are capable of envisioning and forming alliances across ethnic lines succeed
where their rivals fail; the reliable result is a chaotic melting pot of armed
bands and temporary communities drawn from all available sources. When the Huns
first came west from the Eurasian steppes around 370 CE, for example, they were
apparently a federation of related Central Asian tribes; by the time of Attila,
rather less than a century later, his vast armies included warriors from most
of the ethnic groups of eastern Europe. We don’t even know what their leader’s
actual name was; “Attila” was a nickname—“Daddy”—in Visigothic, the lingua
franca among the eastern barbarians at that time.
The same chaotic reshuffling was just as common on the other
side of the collapsing Roman frontiers. The province of Britannia, for
instance, had long been divided into ethnic groups with their own distinct
religious and cultural traditions. In the wake of the Roman collapse and the
Saxon invasions, the survivors who took refuge in the mountains of the west
forgot the old divisions, and took to calling themselves by a new name: Combrogi,
“fellow-countrymen” in old Brythonic. Nowadays that’s Cymry,
the name the Welsh use for themselves.
Not everyone who ended up as Combrogi was British by
ancestry—one of the famous Welsh chieftains in the wars against the Saxons was
a Visigoth named Theodoric—nor were all the people on the other side Saxons—one
of the leaders of the invaders was a Briton named Caradoc ap Cunorix, the “Cerdic son of Cynric” of the Anglo-Saxon
Chronicle.
It’s almost impossible to overstate the efficiency of the
blender into which every political, economic, social, and ethnic manifestation
got tossed in the last years of Rome. My favorite example of the raw confusion
of that time is the remarkable career of another Saxon leader named Odoacer. He
was the son of one of Attila the Hun’s generals, but got involved in Saxon
raids on Britain after Attila’s death. Sometime in the 460s, when the struggle
between the Britons and the Saxons was more or less stuck in deadlock, Odoacer
decided to look for better pickings elsewhere, and led a Saxon fleet that
landed at the mouth of the Loire in western France. For the next decade or so,
more or less in alliance with Childeric, king of the Franks, he fought the
Romans, the Goths, and the Bretons there.
When the Saxon hold on the Loire was finally broken, Odoacer
took the remains of his force and joined Childeric in an assault on Italy. No
records survive of the fate of that expedition, but it apparently didn’t go
well. Odoacer next turned up, without an army, in what’s now Austria and was
then the province of Noricum. It took him only a short time to scrape together
a following from the random mix of barbarian warriors to be found there, and in
476 he marched on Italy again, and overthrew the equally random mix of barbarians
who had recently seized control of the peninsula.
The Emperor of the West just then, the heir of the Caesars
and titular lord of half the world, was a boy named Romulus Augustulus. In a
fine bit of irony, he also happened to be the son of Attila the Hun’s Greek
secretary, a sometime ally of Odoacer’s father. This may be why, instead of
doing the usual thing and having the boy killed, Odoacer basically told the
last Emperor of Rome to run along and play.
That sort of clemency was unusual, and it wasn’t repeated by the next
barbarian warlord in line; fourteen years later Odoacer was murdered by order
of Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths, who proceeded to take his place as
temporary master of the corpse of imperial Rome.
Soldiers of fortune, or of misfortune for that matter,
weren’t the only people engaged in this sort of heavily armed tour of the
post-Roman world during those same years. Entire nations were doing the same
thing. Those of my readers who have been watching North America’s climate come
unhinged may be interested to know that severe droughts in Central Asia may
have been the trigger that kickstarted the process, pushing nomadic tribes out
of their traditional territories in a desperate quest for survival. Whether or
not that’s what pushed the Huns into motion, the westward migration of the Huns
forced other barbarian peoples further west to flee for their lives, and the
chain of dominoes thus set in motion played a massive role in creating the
chaos in which figures like Odoacer rose and fell. It’s a measure of the sheer
scale of these migrations that before Rome started to topple, many of the
ancestors of today’s Spaniards lived in what’s now the Ukraine.
And afterwards? The migrations slowed and finally stopped,
the warlords became kings, and the people who found themselves in some more or
less stable kingdom began the slow process by which a random assortment of
refugees and military veterans from the far corners of the Roman world became
the first draft of a nation. The former province of Britannia, for example,
became seven Saxon kingdoms and a varying number of Celtic ones, and then began
the slow process of war and coalescence out of which England, Scotland, Wales,
and Cornwall gradually emerged. Elsewhere, the same process moved at varying
rates; new nations, languages, ethnic groups came into being. The cauldron of
nations had come off the boil, and the history of Europe settled down to a
somewhat less frenetic rhythm.
I’ve used post-Roman Europe as a convenient and solidly documented
example, but transformations of the same kind are commonplace whenever a
civilization goes down. The smaller and more isolated the geographical area of
the civilization that falls, the less likely mass migrations are—ancient China,
Mesopotamia, and central Mexico had plenty of them, while the collapse of the
classic Maya and Heian Japan featured a shortage of wandering hordes—but the
rest of the story is among the standard features you get with societal
collapse. North America is neither small nor isolated, and so it’s a safe bet
that we’ll get a tolerably complete version of the usual process right here in
the centuries ahead.
What does that mean in practice? It means, to begin with,
that a rising spiral of conflict along ethnic, cultural, religious, political,
regional, and social lines will play an ever larger role in North American life
for decades to come. Those of my readers who have been paying attention to
events, especially but not only in the United States, will have already seen
that spiral getting under way. As the first few rounds of economic contraction
have begun to bite, the standard response of every group you care to name has
been to try to get the bite taken out of someone else. Listen to the insults
being flung around in the political controversies of the present day—the
thieving rich, the shiftless poor, and the rest of it—and notice how many of
them amount to claims that wealth that ought to belong to one group of people
is being unfairly held by another. In those claims, you can hear the first
whispers of the battle-cries that will be shouted as the usual internecine wars
begin to tear our civilization apart.
As those get under way, for reasons we’ll discuss at length
in future posts, governments and the other institutions of civil society will
come apart at the seams, and the charismatic leaders already mentioned will
rise to fill their place. In response, existing loyalties will begin to
dissolve as the normal process of warband formation kicks into overdrive. In
such times a strong and gifted leader like Attila the Hun can unite any number
of contending factions into a single overwhelming force, but at this stage such
things have no permanence; once the warlord dies, ages, or runs out of luck,
the forces so briefly united will turn on each other and plunge the continent
back into chaos.
There will also be mass migrations, and far more likely than
not these will be on a scale that would have impressed Attila himself. That’s
one of the ways that the climate change our civilization has unleashed on the
planet is a gift that just keeps on giving; until the climate settles back down
to some semblance of stability, and sea levels have risen as far as they’re
going to rise, people in vulnerable areas are going to be forced out of their
homes by one form of unnatural catastrophe or another, and the same desperate
quest for survival that may have sent the Huns crashing into Eastern Europe
will send new hordes of refugees streaming across the landscape. Some of those
hordes will have starting points within the United States—I expect mass
migrations from Florida as the seas rise, and from the Southwest as drought
finishes tightening its fingers around the Sun Belt’s throat—while others will
come from further afield.
Five centuries from now, as a result, it’s entirely possible
that most people in the upper Mississippi valley will be of Brazilian ancestry,
and the inhabitants of the Hudson’s Bay region sing songs about their long-lost
homes in drowned Florida, while languages descended from English may be spoken
only in a region extending from New England to the isles of deglaciated
Greenland. Nor will these people think of themselves in any of the national and
ethnic terms that come so readily to our minds today. It’s by no means
impossible that somebody may claim to be Presden of Meriga, Meer of Kanda, or
what have you, just as Charlemagne and his successors claimed to be the
emperors of Rome. Just as the Holy Roman Empire was proverbially neither holy,
nor Roman, nor an empire, neither the office nor the nation at that future time
is likely to have much of anything to do with its nominal equivalent today—and
there will certainly be nations and ethnic groups in that time that have no
parallel today.
One implication of these points may be worth noting here, as
we move deeper into the stage of ethnic conflict. No matter what your ethnic
group, dear reader, no matter how privileged or underprivileged it may happen
to be in today’s world, it will almost certainly no longer exist as such when industrial
civilization on this continent finishes the arc of the Long Descent. Such of
your genes as make it through centuries of dieoff and ruthless Darwinian
selection will be mixed with genes from many other nationalities and corners of
the world, and it’s probably a safe bet that the people who carry those genes
won’t call themselves by whatever label you call yourself. When a civilization
falls the way ours is falling, that’s how things generally go.
*****************
In other news, I’m delighted to announce that my latest book, Twilight’s Last Gleaming, a novel based on the five-part scenario of US imperial collapse and dissolution posted here in 2012, will be hitting the bookshelves on October 31 of this year. Those of my readers who are interested may like to know that the publisher, Karnac Books, is offering a discount and free worldwide shipping on preorders. Those posts still hold this blog’s all-time record for page views, and the novel’s just as stark and fast-paced as the original posts; those of my readers who enjoy a good political-military thriller might want to check it out. 